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Mr. Gallon concludes his account (in Brainy of this remarkable
investigation as follows :—
"Perhaps the strongest of the impressions left by these experiments
regards the multifariousness of the work done by the mind in a state of half-
unconsciouBness, and the valid reason they afford for believing in the exist-
ence of still deeper strata of mental operations, sunk wholly below the level
of consciousness, which may account for such mental phenomena as cannot
otherwise be explained. We gain an insight by these experiments into the
marvellous number and nimbleness of our mental associations, and we also
learn that they are very far indeed from being infinite in their variety. We
find that our working stock of ideas is narrowly limited, but that the mind
continually recurs to them in conducting its operations ; therefore its tracks
necessarily become more denned and its flexibility diminished as age
advances.
I t is to be hoped that Mr. Gal ton will continue to work in a vein
which his psychological tact renders so fruitful of results. EDITOR.
THE SO-CALLED IDEALISM OF KANT.
In a note with the above title in the last number of MIND, Mr.
Henry Sidgwick makes some criticisms on a passage in my reply to'
Mr. Balfour (MIND XIII.) ; Mr. Sidgwick has, however, misunder-
stood what I said, partly, perhaps, from the too great brevity with
which I expressed myself; but partly also, I think, from his not
attending sufficiently to the context of the passage which he quotes.
Mr. Sidgwick gives the following re-statement of my views :—
" I understand Mr. Caird to affirm (1) that Kant held a doctrine which
may properly be called Idealism, because he regarded the question whether
or not there is an existence of things-in-themselves independent of our
perception of them as ' meaningless ;' and (2) that in his ' Refutation of
Idealism,' he substituted for this the question whether or not we have an
explicit consciousness of objects in space outside our bodies prior to the
explicit consciousness of self as an object"
On this I have to remark, (1) That I did not call Kant an Idealist
because of his doctrine in relation to things-in-themselves: on the con-
trary (as I have shown at great length in my book), I consider that
doctrine the main point in which his Idealism is incomplete. Still, I
think it is quite fair to contrast Kant's philosophy as Idealism with
the so-called Idealism of Berkeley, which should rather, I think, be
called an undeveloped Sensationalism. (2) As I do not deny that
Kant held the doctrine of the existence of things-in-themselves, I could
not possibly say that, in every point of view, the problem whether they
exist or not was to him nnTn mining (though of course I hold that the
legitimate result of his transcendental method is to do away with
them). But what I meant to say, in the passage quoted by Mr.
Sidgwick, was, that the idea of transcendentally deducing the
existence of things-in-themselves as objects of experience, in the
same manner as he attempts in the ' Refutation of Idealism' to
deduce the existence of phenomenal objects in space, would have
been, for Kant, unmeaning. And for this, I think I can bring
Kant's own words in evidence. (3) I said nothing about the " con-
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558 Notes and Discussion*.
scionsness of objects in space outside our bodies "; the words italicised
would deprive Kant's argument, as I understand it, of all meaning, for
what he seeks to show is that inner experience implies outer experience,
and the consciousness of OUT bodies is surely not a part of inner
experience.1 My point, in short, is, that the problem of the relation of
inner to outer experience takes for Kant the place which in previous
philosophy had been given to the problem of the relation of
consciousness to things outeide of consciousness. I shall say a few
' words on each of these points.
(1) Before the passage quoted by Mr. Sidgwick I used the follow-
ing words :
" Mr. Balfour tries to fortify his argument by saying that Idealists, of
all men in the world, as they bold that the ettt of things is their mtdligi,
ought to hold that there is nothing in the thought of the individual of
which he was not conscious. Now, Idealism is based on the truth
that the only intelligible meaning of objectivity or existence, ia objectivity
for a thinking subject, and that of an object external to thought we can say
nothing. But this no more implies that the individual subject must have
brought to consciousness all that is involved in his knowledge of objects,
than it implies that every individual subject must be omniscient.'' Then
follow the words quoted by Mr. Sidgwick : " The truth is that Mr. Balfour
has never realised the difference between the so-called Idealism of Berkeley
and the Idealism of Kant," &c
The distinction which I was here attempting to express will be clear,
if we remember that, for Kant, the contrast between ' my ideas'
(Voreteliungen) and ' things outside of me ' has two meanings. In
one sense he would agree with Berkeley that we can know only our
own ideas—in the sense namely, that we cannot know things which
are out of consciousness, which cannot therefore be brought in relation
to the conscious self. But in another sense he insists that we
do know things out of ourselves; i.c, things that are different
from that series of inward states which constitutes the empirical
self. The main aim of the ' Transcendental Deduction' is to show
that we are conscious of objects, and of a world of objects, not through
mere sense, but only in so far as the one self manifesto itself as a
synthetic principle, which binds together the manifold of sense by
means of the Categories. But the complementary truth is, that we are
conscious of the permanent unity of the self in the succession of its
feelings or conscious states, only in distinction from, and in relation to,
the world of objects so determined. The opposition of ' things outside
of us' to 'our ideas,'i.e., of the world of objects in space and time to the
feelings, perceptions, &c., of the individual, as a series of states in one
permanent subject, is therefore an essential part of the "Kflntinn doc-
trine. And it is by this most of all that he is distinguished from
Berkeley, to whom the percipi and not the intdligi is the este of
things. In other words, Berkeley could not legitimately hold that we
1
 Of course things outeide of me might mean out of my body. A thing
can only be in space as it is out of something else in space, and in familiar
parlance we speak of our bodies as ourselves. But this is not one of the
two senses which Kant distinguishes.
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know more than the states of our own individual subjectivity, while to
Kant this individual subjectivity is merely one of the objects of
experience, which we know in distinction from, yet in relation to,
the other objects of experience.
(2) The ' thing-in-itaelf,' is a presupposition which Kant makes at
the beginning of the Critique, in order, as he afterwards tells us,
" that we may have something to correspond to the sensibility as a
receptivity ". Ultimately, when the question arises as to the validity
of this presupposition, Kant says that it is no object or element of
experience, but merely a ' Qrenzbegriff' or limitative conception, which
prevents us from assaming that in experience we are cognisant of the
absolute reality of things. On the other hand, it casts no light on
anything beyond experience, and, therefore, so far as experience or
knowledge is concerned, we can know nothing of the thing-in-itself,
not even that it exists. This Kant expresses in the following way :
" The understanding limits the sensibility without enlarging its own
scope; when, therefore, it warns the former not to presume to speak of
things-in-themselves, but merely of phenomena, it represents to itself
an object in itself, though merely as a transcendental object, as a cause of
phenomena (which is not in itself a phenomenon). This object, however, it
cannot think of either as quantity, as reality, or as substance, &c (for all
these conceptions require sensible forms in which they determine an
objectl and of it, therefore, we cannot say whether it is within or without
us ; whether if sensibility were taken away from us, it (».«., the thing-in-
itself) would disappear along with the sensibility, or whether if the sensi-
bility were taken away from us it would yet remain. If we please to call
this object Noumenon, because the idea of it is not sensuous, we are at
liberty to do so. As, however, we cannot apply to it any of the conceptions
of the understanding, this idea remains for us empty, and is of no use
whatever, except to mark the limits of the knowledge which we can get
through sense, and to leave a space open which we are able to fill up
neither by means of any possible experience nor by the pure under-
standing.<J—{Kritik d.r.V., Ed. Bosenkranx, p. 234.)
The idea of the Ding-ansieh or Noumenon, is, therefore, merely a
conception which limits our empirical knowledge ; though, as we farther
leam from the 'Dialectic,' it supplies us with an ideal to aim at in add-
ing to that knowledge. By itself, it cannot be an object of knowledge in
any of the three forms which it takes, in relation to inner experience, to
outer experience, and to the totality of experience. For Kant, how-
ever, its existence becomes an object of belief, even of certitude,
through the moral consciousness, and that in all its three forms, as
consciousness of self, of the world, and of God. I t is, therefore, in the
idea of freedom, that is, of the self as a self-determining being, that
Kant finally finds the key-stone that locks together the different
parts of his philosophy and binds the end of it with the beginning.
" This," he says, " is what Archimedes sought, a fixed point to which
reason can apply her lever, resting it neither on the present nor on the
future world, but on its own inward idea of freedom, which is pre-
sented to us as a secure basis through the immovable moral law ".
Or as he elsewhere puts it, " the idea of an intelligible world is only a
point of view which intelligence sees iteelf forced to take up in order to
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think of itself as practical". (WerJce VTH., p. 93.) The same view
is briefly indicated in the preface to the Second Edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason. Of course I do not here attempt to criticise Kant's
doctrine, but merely to point out on what basis he ultimately rested
that belief in the existence of things-in-themselves with which he
started but which might seem otherwise to be made impossible by the
advancing application of the transcendental method.
(3) With relation to the ' Refutation of Idealism/ Mr. Sidgwick's
argument seems to me to rest upon the ambiguity already mentioned
as to the contrast between ' things outside of me,' and ' my ideas,'
as if the assertion of Kant that we know real things without us, and
not merely our own ideas, must mean that we know things-in-them-
selves. And this* presumption, Mr. Sidgwick strengthens by reference
to a passage in the Prolegomena, where, in opposition to Berkeley, Kant
asserts his belief that things-in-themselves exist without us, though
we know them only in their phenomena. But, in the first place, it is
to be noted, that in the ' Refutation of Idealism,' Kant is not arguing
against Berkeley, whose doctrine was that the only thing is the percep-
tion, but against Descartes, to whom he attributes the doctrine that we
immediately know only OUT own states of consciousness, and that from
them we infer the existence of things without us. And in opposition
to this doctrine, he naturally develops his view that the consciousness
of our own ideas as states of ourselves presupposes the consciousness
of objects in space, which are without us in the sense of not being part
of that series of feelings or ideas which we identify with the self as
opposed to the notself. Nor in this ' Refutation ' is there, as it seems
to me, a single hint that Kant is speaking of things-in-themselves.
On the contrary he begins by saying, that his object is to prove that
" we have of outward things not merely imagination, but experience,"
and that he can best do this by showing that even " our inner experi-
ence, which was not an object of doubt to Descartes himself, is
possible only under the presupposition of outward experience ". And
after the proof is finished, he repeats that he has been proving that " we
have not merely outward imagination, but outward perception," and
that he has been seeking to turn the tables upon those who had said
that we reach our knowledge of outward things merely by reasoning
from effect to cause. And the argument itself is based on the idea
that it is only in outer experience, i.e., under conditions of space with
its permanent self-external parts, that we can find a matter of sense that
can be brought under the category of substance, which is the basis of all
time-determinations. Here again I do not stop to criticise the argu-
ment, but it is one which was familiar to Kant, and which reappears in
many places of his works (cf. Kritik cLr.V., p. 304, and Metaph.
Anfangsgrunde, p. 405, where the thought is most fully developed).
For the rest, it is quite true that Kant does not hesitate to speak of
the thing-in-itself as given to us through sense, any more than he
hesitates to speak of the object of experience as so given (cf. the first
sentence of the ' ^Esthetic,' where we find the two identified or con-
fused together); but, as it is the whole purport of the ' Transcendental
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Analytic' to show that objects of experience are known to us as such
only through the synthesis of the Understanding, so, in the 'Dialectic'
and the Critique of Practical Season, he maintains that the ideas of
things-in-themselves, i.e., of the three Noumena, are derived only
from Beason, and that the certitude of the existence of such objects
comes to us only through the moral consciousness.1
With regard to the name ' Idealism,' it was not my intention to raise
any controversy. How I came to use it, is shown by the first sentence
of the quotation given above from my reply to Mr. Balfour. But if
Plato is to be taken, as surely he should be, as the type of Idealism,
it is a waste of good words to apply the name to any form of Sensa-
tionalism. And if this be true, Berkeley can be called an Idealist only
because of the inconsistencies of his earlier theory, or because of the
later view indicated in the Siris. Further, as is shown by the
writings of Mr. Spencer and many others, this misuse of the term has
led to great confusion; for, partly because of it, Kant, and even his
most thorough-going Idealistic successors, have been assumed to
hold the theory that all we can know is the states of the individual
consciousness.
EDWABD CAIHD.
VII—CRITICAL NOTICES.
The Data of Ethics. By HERBKET SFBNOBB. London: Williams
and Norgate, 1879.
In the immense abundance of literary production a great deal of
criticism is avowedly calculated to supersede the perusal of the works
themselves. Such a book as the present, however, is among the rarest;
and being on the most interesting of all themes, and withal lucid and
short, the critic would be much mistaken in assuming that it will not
be read by his own readers and many besides.
The field of Ethics has been crossed and re-crossed in many direc-
tions ; and we are now called to follow a new and unbeaten track.
Our interest and expectation are awakened, not simply on account of
the general philosophic ability of the writer, which disposes us to
listen to him on any topic that he may see fit to take up, but also be-
cause he regards the work before us as the end and outcome of all his
labours, the object to which all the preceding parts of his systematic
elaboration are preparatory. The philosophy of Evolution, which ho
has spent his life in constructing, is here to reach its application to
practice. With a view to the popularity of the work, this may seem
a disadvantage, as comparatively few of those that are attracted to a
i It may, of course, be doubted whether the crude Realism of Kant's
first "language can be vindicated from the point of view of the Critique of
Practical Reaton (cf Phil, of Kant, p. 530).
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